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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of macro-level disagreement on the cross-section
of stock returns. Using forecast dispersion measures from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters database as proxy for macro disagreement, I find that when disagreement
about a macroeconomic factor is high, stocks that have high loadings on that macro-
factor earn lower future returns relative to stocks with low loadings and vice versa.
This negative relation between returns for macro-factors and macro-level disagreement
is robust and exists for a large set of macroeconomic risk factors. These findings are
consistent with the model of Hong and Sraer (2012), in which high beta stocks are more
prone to speculative mispricing than low beta stocks due to their greater sensitivity
to aggregate disagreement, resulting in lower subsequent returns for high beta stocks
during high aggregate disagreement states.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how investors’ dispersion of beliefs on certain important macroeco-
nomic variables affects prices in the cross-section of stocks. Asset pricing theories posit
that pervasive macroeconomic factors should be systematic risk factors that get priced in
equilibrium. For example, in the Merton (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model
(ICAPM), expected stock return is determined by its return covariance with innovation in
state variables that reflect time-varying investment opportunities. Macroeconomic factors
(such as industrial production growth and expected inflation) naturally serve as a proxy for
such state variables. The consumption-based asset pricing model predicts that an asset’s re-
turn covariance with consumption growth rate determines its riskiness and, hence, expected
return (Breeden, 1979). Even the Sharpe-Lintner Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965) can be viewed in some way as a macro factor-based asset
pricing model in which the only state variable is the return on the market portfolio.
Despite the theoretical importance of macroeconomic risk factors in explaining the cross-
section of expected asset returns, empirical evidence on the existence of risk premia on
macro-factors is mixed and not robust to the different econometric methodologies used. One
of the most influential papers is by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), who find exposures to
five macroeconomic factors including industrial production growth, the change in expected
inflation, unexpected inflation, the yield spread between a long-term and a short-term gov-
ernment bond, and the yield spread between low credit rating and high credit rating bonds,
are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Shanken and Weinstein (2006), however,
find that the results of Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) are not robust to alternative test assets
and the way the betas are estimated. Macro factor-based asset pricing models also fail to
explain certain cross-sectional stock return anomalies such as momentum (Griffin, Ji and
Martin, 2003) and the profitability premium (Wang and Yu, 2013). Most studies commonly
attribute the empirical failure of the macro factor-based asset pricing model to the large mea-
surement errors in macroeconomic factors, the differences between a theoretical definition
and its empirical counterpart, or the low frequency in reporting macroeconomic variables.
This paper offers a novel way to look at the price of macroeconomic risk factors in cross-
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section of stocks, motivated by Hong and Sraer (2012). They argue that the speculative
nature of high beta stocks offsets the risk-sharing effect, leading to the high beta-low return
puzzle. In their model, investors disagree on the mean value of a common market factor.
Because high beta stocks have high loadings on this market factor, investors naturally dis-
agree more on the cash flows of high beta stocks when disagreement about the market factor
is high.1 As a result, the value of high beta stocks more likely is determined by optimists
who have a positive view of the market factor. Arbitragers are not able to fully correct
the mispricing due to short-selling constraints and other market frictions, resulting in lower
subsequent returns for high beta stocks relative to low beta stocks. Extending Hong and
Sraer (2012)’s argument regarding general macroeconomic factors, I hypothesize that high
macro beta stocks will experience lower future returns relative to low macro beta stocks when
disagreement on this macro factor is high. Furthermore, high macro beta stocks should earn
higher average returns during normal times when risk-return trade-off works. Depending on
the magnitude of macro-level disagreement and how sensitive these high macro beta stocks
are to the macro-factors, the overpricing effect can even dominate the risk-return trade-off
mechanism. The unconditionally insignificant price of risk found on these macro-factors
could be due to the offsetting effects on high macro beta stocks coming from two forces: risk
compensation and speculative mispricing.
Empirical evidence strongly supports my hypothesis. While the unconditional return
differences between the low and high macro beta stocks are all close to zero, I find that, for
positively priced macroeconomic factors, high macro beta stocks earn higher (lower) future
returns during low (high) disagreement months relative to low macro beta stocks. I use
the cross-sectional forecast dispersion measure from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) database to proxy for investors’ disagreement on macro-factors. A zero-investment
portfolio that longs stocks in the highest macro beta decile and shorts those in the lowest
beta decile generates positive excess returns following low macro disagreement months, while
the excess return on this long-short portfolio is significantly lower or even negative following
1The model of Hong and Sraer (2012) predicts that an individual stock’s sensitivity to aggregate dis-
agreement should be positively related to its absolute value of beta, not beta itself. For the market factor
and most positively priced macro-factors, because stock returns are positively correlated with that factor,
high (low) absolute beta stocks correspond to high (low) beta stocks.
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high disagreement months. The negative relation between risk premium for macro-factors
and macro disagreement is robust and exists for a large set of macroeconomic risk factors,
including industrial production growth, labor income growth, short-term interest rate, real
GDP growth, real nonresidential fixed investment growth and change of expected inflation.
Industrial production growth, for example, has a high-minus-low monthly excess return of
0.57% following the lowest quartile of disagreement months. It has a negative monthly
return of -1.01% following the highest quartile of disagreement months. The excess return
difference in these two disagreement states is -1.58% and statistically significant at the 5%
level. Results on other macro-factors show similar or even stronger patterns.
I conduct further time-series regression analyses to systematically examine the relation
between macro-factor risk premia and disagreement, controlling for other well-known return
predictability effects. My results show a reliable negative relation between the high-minus-
low portfolio excess return and the lagged macro disagreement measure for positively priced
macro-factors. Of the six macroeconomic factors examined in this paper, five have signif-
icant regression coefficients on the lagged macro disagreement measure. For example, the
coefficient on dispersion for industrial production growth is -0.007 (t=-2.59) in the uni-
variate predictive regression. A one standard deviation increase of dispersion on industrial
production growth leads to a 0.66% reduction of the monthly excess return on the high-
minus-low portfolio. The results barely change or even become stronger when I control for
Fama-French (1993) three factors or Carhart (1997) four factors in the predictive regression,
indicating that my findings are not driven by some well-known cross-sectional stock return
predictability patterns in the data.
The effect of macro disagreement on the cross-section of stock returns I document in
this paper could simply reflect time-varying risk premium, instead of the mispricing story
advocated by Hong and Sraer (2012) and my paper. My macro disagreement measures
could also be interpreted as economic uncertainty measures.2 They are highly correlated with
several business cycle indicators, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
recession dummy, the dividend/price ratio (D/P), and the default premium. However, the
time-varying risk premium explanation cannot fully account for the return predictability
2See Bali et al. (2014) for such an interpretation.
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I identify in this paper. First, macro disagreement tend to be high during recessions and
market downturns when underlying economic uncertainty also increases. The time-varying
risk premium story predicts that the return spread between high and low macro beta stocks
should be higher following high disagreement than following low disagreement periods. My
empirical results are contrary to this prediction. Furthermore, I control for an extensive list
of lagged macroeconomic state variables that have been found to predict time-varying equity
risk premia in the predictive regressions, including the dividend/price ratio, the term spread,
the default premium, the detrended one-month Treasury-bill rate, the consumption-to-wealth
ratio, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Market Volatility Index (VIX), and
the TED spread. The main results survive even after I control for all these lagged return
predictors.
My results show that despite an insignificant average price of risk for macroeconomic
factors, some of these factors are priced during low disagreement periods when the risk-
sharing incentive dominates, lending support to the traditional asset pricing theories. When
macro disagreement is high, however, high macro beta stocks become increasingly specula-
tive and overpriced due to their larger sensitivity to macro-factors, resulting in lower future
returns. To pin down the underlying mechanism of the negative relationship between macro
disagreement and macro factor risk premium, I look at how stock-level disagreement relates
to macro-level disagreement, using the standard deviation of analysts’ forecast of long-term
growth (LTG) rate of earnings per share (EPS) from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (I/B/E/S) as a proxy for stock-level disagreement. Stocks with high absolute macro
betas have higher stock-level disagreement, and the difference of stock-level disagreement
between high and low macro beta stocks becomes larger as macro disagreement increases.
Previous studies (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina 2002) document that stocks with high ana-
lyst forecast dispersion have lower subsequent returns in the cross-section. This test further
supports my hypothesis that high macro beta stocks earn lower future returns precisely
because these stocks are subject to higher stock-level disagreement arising from their high
exposure to macro disagreement.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. My work builds on the model
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of Hong and Sraer (2012) and shows that the central prediction of their model holds well for
a large set of macroeconomic factors in addition to the aggregate market factor. My paper
differs from their paper in several important ways, however. My interest is in the price
of risk for fundamental macroeconomic factors, not just an aggregate market factor. To
the extent that stocks have exposure to multiple systematic risk factors, my paper provides
independent evidence that disagreement on these important macro-factors could also have a
pervasive effect on asset prices and cross-sectional risk-return trade-off. Also, while Hong and
Sraer (2012) construct an aggregate disagreement measure by weighting individual stocks’
forecast dispersion using their market betas, my measures of macro disagreement are taken
directly from survey data. My macro disagreement measures are more likely exogenous to
the financial market, thus suggesting causality from macro-level disagreement to stock-level
disagreement. Causality is less clear for a macro disagreement measure constructed using
individual stocks’ disagreement measures. While several previous studies have examined
stock-level disagreement and its impact on stock prices (e.g., Diether, Malloy and Scherbina,
2002; Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002; Goetzmann and Massa, 2005), few studies look at the
effect of disagreement over macroeconomic states on asset prices. My study is also related to
the investor sentiment literature showing that time-varying aggregate sentiment combined
with limits to arbitrage could affect the cross-sectional as well as time-series risk-return
trade-off. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) find stocks that are difficult-to-value and hard-
to-arbitrage are more subject to changes in investor sentiment and, hence, mispricing. Yu and
Yuan (2011) and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012) document that the risk-return tradeoff in
aggregate stock market and the profitability of certain cross-sectional stock return anomalies
depend on sentiment. The predictive power of macro disagreement is unaffected when I
control for the sentiment index, however.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and
develops the main hypotheses to be tested in this paper. Section 3 describes the data, how
I choose macroeconomic factors, and how I construct macro beta-sorted portfolios as test
assets. In Section 4, I show that high macro beta stocks earn lower future returns than
low macro beta stocks following high disagreement states, using portfolio sorts, predictive
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regressions, and the Fama-Macbeth (1973) two-stage regression approach. In this section, I
also examine the role played by macro disagreement on the relation between stock-level dis-
agreement and macro beta. In Section 5, I conduct robustness tests and rule out alternative
explanations. The last section concludes.
2 Hypothesis Development
2.1 Disagreement, Short-Sales Constraints and Asset Prices
A large and growing literature explores the effect of investor disagreement, or heteroge-
neous beliefs on asset prices. Miller (1977) argues that when investors have divergences of
opinion and short-selling is not allowed, stock prices in equilibrium will reflect only the opti-
mists’ view and, hence, will more likely be overvalued. The central prediction from the Miller
(1977) model is that the higher the differences of opinion, the more overvalued the stock will
be contemporaneously, and the lower its future returns. Subsequent empirical studies gen-
erally find evidence supporting Miller’s prediction that stocks with higher analyst forecast
dispersion or lower breadth of ownership earn lower risk-adjusted return (Chen, Hong, and
Stein, 2002; Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002). Recently, Yu (2011) finds that Miller’s
prediction also holds for the market portfolio, in which high aggregate disagreement predicts
lower subsequent aggregate equity returns. In a dynamic setting, Harrison and Kreps (1978)
show that stock price could even exceed the most optimistic investors’ valuation as these
investors anticipate selling the stock to a more optimistic trader in the future. The key in-
sight in the Harrison and Kreps model is that the combination of short-sales constraints and
fluctuating heterogeneous beliefs create a valuable ”resale option” embedded in stock prices,
which can push the price above the most optimistic investors’ valuation of fundamentals.
Recent contributions to this line of research include Morris (1996), Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006).3
A necessary condition for investors’ difference of opinion to have an asymmetry effect
on asset prices is short-selling constraints. Otherwise, pessimists could simply short sell
3Empirical evidence supporting the heterogeneous beliefs-based bubble theory include Lamont and Thaler
(2003), Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Xiong and Yu (2011).
6
overvalued stocks aggressively and drive price to consensus view. Numerous studies have
argued pervasive short selling costs exist in the stock market, due to institutional constraints,
trading costs, or arbitrage risks. Many institutional investors such as mutual funds are
prohibited by charters from taking short positions in stocks. Almazan et al. (2004) find
that 69% of mutual funds are not permitted to short sell. Even for the 21% of mutual
funds that are allowed to short sell, only 9.6% of them ever shorted. Furthermore, short
selling can be too costly to implement for certain kinds of stocks. D’Avolio (2002) finds that
the rebate rate for short selling can become economically significant when the short-selling
demand increases relative to the supply of lendable shares. Short sellers also face the ”uptick
rule” and recall risk.4 Arbitrage risk can deter short-selling behavior even in the absence
of explicit short-selling costs. One type of arbitrage risk is ”noise trader risk”, which is
the temporary worsening of the initial mispricing caused by sentiment-driven investors, as
emphasized in De Long et al. (1990). As long as arbitrageurs have finite horizons, they
always worry th the mispricing they are trying to arbitrage away will get worse in the short
run, forcing them to liquidate their positions prematurely and suffer losses. In practice,
most of the sophisticated arbitrageurs are professional investors who manage clients’ money.
This means that investors might withdraw money from their funds precisely when mispricing
widens and the arbitrageurs suffer losses temporarily (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Fear of
premature liquidation and temporary losses limits the size of arbitrageurs’ initial positions,
rendering the arbitrage effect less powerful in reestablishing equilibrium prices.5
2.2 Macro Disagreement and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns
While the aforementioned studies mainly look at stock-level disagreement and its impact
on asset prices, my study focuses on disagreement about macroeconomic state variables.
4The ”uptick rule” refers to short selling not being allowed except on an uptick. Regarding recall risk,
the lender has the right to recall his shares at any time. In the case of recall, the short seller must either
locate another lender who is willing to provide the same security or cover its position by directly purchasing
from the market. The short seller thus faces the risks of having to close out his positions at a loss when
lenders recall shares in a rising market.
5Consistent with the argument that short-selling constraints deter arbitrage activities, Nagel (2005) finds
the under-performance of stocks in the short-leg of several cross-sectional anomaly strategies is most pro-
nounced among stocks with low institutional ownership. Recently, Drechsler and Song (2014) document that
many anomalies exist only among stocks with high short fees.
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Substantial evidence, from both anecdotal stories and survey data, suggests that economists
and investors alike tend to disagree on certain important macroeconomic state variables.
Macro-level disagreement can come from various sources, such as overconfidence, infrequent
updating of information, or differential interpretation of public signals (Kandel and Pearson,
1995).6 In this paper, I do not model the source of macro-level disagreement, but take it as
given and study its effect on the cross-section of stock prices.
Hong and Sraer (2012) assumes the dividend process of individual firms follow one factor
structure, with differential exposures to the common market factor. Investors disagree only
on the common market factor and stocks with high exposure to the market factor naturally
subject to more stock-level disagreement. I extend their argument further, assuming that
the dividend process of individual firms have exposures to not only the market factor, but
also other pervasive economy-wide factors such as GDP growth and inflation rate:
di = d+ bi ∗ Z + ci ∗X + i (1)
Here di is stock i’s dividend, Z is the market factor and X is the macro factor. The id-
iosyncratic component in stock i’s dividend is i. bi and ci are individual stocks’ cash flow
exposure to the common market and macro factor, respectively. When investor disagreement
on macro factor X is high, other things being equal, stocks that have high exposures to the
macro factor will also subject to more stock-level disagreement. In other words, stock-level
disagreement can be decomposed into a systematic component and an idiosyncratic compo-
nent, with the former being a product of macro-level disagreement and the stock’s loading
on that macro-factor. My first hypothesis follows directly from this decomposition.
Hypothesis 1: Other things equal, high absolute macro beta stocks have higher stock-level
disagreement when macro disagreement is high.
My second hypothesis combines the insight from the disagreement and short-sales con-
straints literature. Because high macro beta stocks are subject to a greater divergence of
6In the Mankiw and Reis (2002) model, only a subset of agents updates information at a given time due to
the costs in collecting and processing macroeconomic information. When the macroeconomic environment
changes, disagreement arises naturally between the agents who have updated information and those who
have not done so.
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opinion on macro-factors, their valuations more likely tend to be set by optimists than low
macro beta stocks. This effect is stronger when macro disagreement is high. Consequently,
the future returns of high macro-beta stocks are lower following high macro disagreement
periods than following low disagreement periods. When macro disagreement is low, however,
risk-return trade-off should work and high macro beta stocks should earn higher average re-
turns than low macro beta stocks to compensate for the larger systematic risks embedded
in these stocks.
Hypothesis 2: For positively priced macro-factors, the return differential between the high
and low macro beta portfolios will be lower following high macro disagreement states than
following low macro disagreement states.
In the subsequent sections, I take the two hypotheses to the data and examine the
conditioning role played by macro disagreement on the cross-sectional risk-return trade-off,
and I consider whether this could shed light on the puzzle with respect to the pricing of
macro-factors. That is, high macro beta stocks do not earn higher average returns than low
macro beta stocks unconditionally.
3 Data Description and Empirical Approach
In this section, I describe the measures of macro-level disagreement, and my choice of
macroeconomic factors, and I outline how I construct macro-beta sorted portfolios as test
assets.
3.1 Measuring Macro Disagreement
My measures of macro disagreement are taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) database, currently maintained by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The Survey
of Professional Forecasters is the oldest quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasts in the
United States.7 In addition to the mean and median forecasts of individual responses from
7Market economists from Wall Street financial firms, banks, economic consulting firms, independent
research institutes and Fortune 500 companies provide the forecasts as part of their daily jobs. The survey
began in 1968 and was conducted by the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of
Economic Research at that time. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in 1990.
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each economist, this dataset contains the cross-sectional measures of forecast dispersion for
several important macroeconomic variables. The cross-sectional forecast dispersion measure
is defined as the difference between the 75th Percentile and 25th percentile of the forecasts.
This measure directly captures market participants’ belief dispersions on various aspects of
the macro-economy and is ideal for the purpose of my study. Detailed discussions on this
dataset can be found in Croushore (1993). The SPF dataset contains forecasts on both the
level and the growth rate of macroeconomic variables. For industrial production, GDP, and
nonresidential fixed investment, I use the disagreement measures for the quarterly growth
rates of these variables. For Treasury bill rate and inflation rate, I use the disagreement
measures for the levels of the rates. The SPF data doesn’t contain disagreement measure
for labor income growth, so I use forecast dispersion on unemployment rate as a proxy
for disagreement for labor market conditions. At each survey date, the quarterly forecast
horizons are one to four quarters ahead. I take the mean value of the cross-sectional forecast
dispersion available at all forecast horizons as the measure of macro disagreement. The time
series of these forecast dispersion measures starts from the third quarter of 1981 and ends
in the last quarter of 2011.8
I construct several important macroeconomic state variables in addition to the macro
disagreement measure. The consumption growth rate (Con g) is the monthly per capita
growth of nondurable consumption and service, seasonally adjusted. The expected market
volatility (Mkt vol.) is the fitted value from modeling the variance of the value-weighted
CRSP index return as GARCH (1,1) process. The Dividend/Price ratio (D/P) is the dif-
ference between the log of dividends and the log of prices, where dividends are 12-month
moving sums of dividends paid on the S&P 500 index. The dividend/price ratio is available
on Amit Goyal’s website. Following Yu (2011), I construct the aggregate disagreement mea-
sure (Agg Disp.) by value-weighting analysts’ forecast dispersion on individual stock’s EPS
long-term growth rate (LTG) in each month. The investor sentiment index (Sentiment) is
8During my sample period from 1981Q3 to 2011Q4, the average number of macro forecasters is 35, with
a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 53 forecasters. Most of the time the number of forecasters is greater
than 30, but during the transition period from 1987Q4 to 1990Q3 (when the Philadelphia Fed took over the
survey), the number is significantly lower. This could mechanically reduces the forecast dispersion on macro
variables, but my results still hold if this transition period is excluded.
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the market-based sentiment measure constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007). I use
the monthly sentiment index which has been orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroe-
conomic conditions.9 Term spread is the yield spread between the ten-year Treasury bond
and the one-year Treasury bond. The default premium is the yield spread between Moody’s
Baa and Aaa corporate bonds. The TED spread is defined as the difference between the
three-month London Interband Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the three month T-bill rate. The
VIX index is constructed so that it measures the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility
implied by at-the-money S&P 500 index option prices.10 The sample period is from the third
quarter of 1981 to the last quarter of 2011.11
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the six macro disagreement measures and
other macro variables. As can be seen in Panel A, the minimum and maximum value and the
standard deviation of disagreement measures are large relative to their mean value, indicating
large time variation in macro disagreement. Panel B reports the pairwise correlation of
these variables. The disagreement measures for different macro-factors are correlated, but
they also contain independent information. The correlation between my macro disagreement
measure extracted from survey data and the bottom-up aggregate stock market disagreement
measure is moderate. The aggregate disagreement measure captures investors’ differences of
opinions on the earnings growth potential of the whole economy, which may not necessarily
coincide with forecast dispersion on other aspects of the macro-economy such as inflation
or unemployment rate. The correlation with the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index is high,
which is consistent with a disagreement-based explanation of investor sentiment shifts. The
correlation of macro disagreement with expected market volatility and VIX index is also very
high. This is to be expected, as disagreement among agents naturally increases as economic
uncertainty increases. My macro disagreement measures are highly correlated with the D/P
ratio and the default premium, indicating that macro disagreement tends to increase during
9For more details on the construction of the index, see Baker and Wurgler (2006). We thank Malcolm
Baker and Jeffrey Wurgler for making the Sentiment Index publicly available.
10The VIX index is backfilled only to 1990. Prior to 1990, I use the volatility index based on the S&P 100
index, which is available at the CBOE’s website, starting from January 1986.
11The monthly sentiment index is available from July 1965 to December 2010. The aggregate disagreement
measure is available from December 1981, and the time series of VIX index and TED spread starts from
January 1986.
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recessions when the risk premium is also high. Only moderate correlation exists between
macro disagreement and the consumption growth rate.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Figure 1 plots the time series of six macro disagreement measures, with NBER-dated
recession periods in the shaded area. The figure clearly shows large inter-temporal shifts in
disagreement level for all six macro factors across time. As expected, macro disagreement
is usually high during recession periods such as the recent financial crisis.12 However, for
real GDP growth and investment growth factors, disagreement is also high during the boom
times, such as the dot-come bubble period in the late 1990s.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
Panel C of Table 1 report the autocorrelations of these macro disagreement measures,
up to 12 lags (three years). The first order autocorrelation is around 0.5 for almost all the
disagreement measures, indicating a half-life of one quarter. The persistence of the macro
disagreement measure from the SPF dataset is strikingly lower than that of the aggregate
disagreement measure in Yu (2011). This further supports the notion that my macro dis-
agreement measures capture different aspects of the macro-economy from the disagreement
measure for the aggregate stock market.
Other data used in this paper come from various sources. U.S. stock monthly return
data are from CRSP and include all the common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ exchanges from January 1976 to December 2011. Excluded are closed-end funds,
real estate investment trust, American depository receipts, and foreign stocks. The data
on macroeconomic variables are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, and Bureau of Labor Statistics. I use the standard deviations of ana-
lysts forecast of EPS long-term growth rate (LTG) as the proxy for stock-level disagreement.
These data are provided in the I/B/E/S database. I use analyst forecasts data from Decem-
ber 1981 through December 2011.
12Regressions of macro disagreement measures on a dummy variable indicating NBER-dated recession
periods all yield significant positive coefficients.
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3.2 Macroeconomic Factors and Factor Mimicking Portfolios
The macroeconomic factors considered in this paper are industrial production growth
(IPG), labor income growth (LaIncome), short-term interest rate (Tbill), real GDP growth
(GDP), real nonresidential fixed investment growth (Investment) and change in expected
inflation (DEI).
The choice of macroeconomic factors is governed by both asset pricing theories and data
availability for the disagreement measures. Among the six macro-factors, industrial produc-
tion growth and change in expected inflation are also studied by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986)
in their seminal study.13 Following Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), I define industrial produc-
tion growth as IPGt = logIPt − logIPt−1, where IPt is the index of industrial production
at month t. I lead industrial production growth by one month since IPt actually is the flow
of industrial production during month t.
I measure inflation rate from month t-1 to month t as It = logCPISAt− logCPISAt−1,
where CPISAt is the seasonally adjusted consumer price index at time t. Change in expected
inflation is defined as DEIt = E[It+1|t]−E[It|t−1]. The expected inflation E[It|t−1] is the
one month Treasury bill rate minus ex-ante real rate. I use the Fama and Gibbons (1984)
method to measure the ex-ante real rate. I use the change in expected inflation instead of
unexpected inflation because it is more closely aligned with the disagreement measure on
inflation expectation.
Mayers (1972), Campbell (1996), Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Santos and Veronesi
(2006) argue that human capital should be part of the market portfolio, and that stocks’
covariance with the return on human capital should be priced in the equilibrium. Labor
income growth is used as a proxy for return on human capital in these studies and is found
to be positively priced in cross-sectional tests. I follow Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and
measure labor income growth as LaIncomet = [Lt−1 +Lt−2]/[Lt−2 +Lt−3], where Lt−1 is the
monthly per capita labor income at month t-1.
The short-term interest rate factor is included because it can predict future stock returns
13The forecast dispersion measures for the term spread and default spread start from the first quarter of
1992 and the first quarter of 2010, respectively. Due to the limited sample period, in this paper I do not
include these two factors, which are also studied by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986).
13
(Fama and Schwert, 1977; Campbell, 1987) and may serve as a state variable capturing time-
varying investment opportunities (Ferson, 1989). Recently, Lioui and Maio (2012) build a
general equilibrium asset pricing model including an interest rate as a priced factor and find
that stocks’ loadings on this factor can explain the cross-section of stock returns well. I take
the first difference of a three-month Treasury bill rate as a proxy for short-term interest risk
factor.14
Real GDP growth is a pervasive systematic risk factor that should be positively priced.
Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Vassalou (2003) find that returns on Fama-French factors
such as SMB and HML can predict future GDP growth rate and interpret the evidence as
supporting a GDP risk-based explanation of the size effect and value premium. I include
real GDP growth rate as an additional macroeconomic risk factor.
Finally, I consider real nonresidential fixed investment growth as motivated by a production-
based asset pricing model.15 Both GDP growth and investment growth rate at quarter t are
defined as the log difference of the level between quarter t and t-1.
Most macroeconomic variables are subject to large measurement errors, infrequent re-
porting, and summation bias (Breeden et al. 1989), so I do not use them directly in the
empirical tests. Following Breeden et al. (1989) and Lamont (2001), I create mimicking
portfolios to track the underlying macro-factors by estimating the coefficient w in the re-
gression:
yt = a+ wXt + ut (2)
where yt is the underlying macro-factor and Xt is the excess returns on a set of base assets.
The corresponding portfolio return wXt is the portfolio that has the maximum in-sample
correlation with the underlying macroeconomic factor. I use the Fama-French ten indus-
try portfolios, a value-weighted market portfolio, Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market
14I do not use sophisticated time series methods to extract the residual part but instead use the monthly
first difference or growth rate as a measure of unanticipated movements of macro variables. The reason is
because the first order autocorrelation of the level of these macro variables are high. Also, as argued by
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), using sophisticated time series model to filter out the expected movement in an
independent variable may lead to errors due to mis-specification of the estimated equation for determining
the expected movement.
15Cochrane (1996) finds that the growth rate of aggregate investment can help explain the cross-section
of stock returns.
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sorted portfolios, and five bond portfolios as the base assets. The Fama-French portfolio
returns are available on Kenneth French’s website. The five bond portfolios are from the
Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond indexes database, including four investment-grade tiers
(AAA, AA, A, BBB) and one non-investment-grade credit tier. I run the regression (2) using
the full sample data to get the estimated coefficient w.16 This factor mimicking portfolio
approach has been widely used by previous studies on the pricing of non-return risk factors,
including Vassalou (2003) and Ang et al. (2006). Another advantage of using factor mimick-
ing portfolios is that quarterly observations of real GDP growth and investment growth rate
can be transformed into monthly frequency by simply multiplying the estimated portfolio
weights w with monthly excess returns on the base assets.
Table 2 reports the correlations among the six macro-factors. Panel A shows the corre-
lations among the original macroeconomic factors, Panel B, the factor mimicking portfolio
returns. As expected, the correlations among industrial production growth, real GDP growth
and investment growth are high, and change in expected inflation and T-bill rate have only
moderate correlation with other macro-factors. Correlations among mimicking portfolios
track closely those among original factors.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
3.3 Constructing Macro Beta-Sorted Portfolios
Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) use 20 equal-weighted size sorted portfolios in examining
the price of risk of macroeconomic factors. The idea is that the test assets should have a
large spread in average returns to detect the pricing effects of macro-factors. In this paper,
however, I want the test assets to have large spreads in their exposures to macroeconomic
factors, because my story is that high macro beta stocks will amplify macro-level disagree-
ment and, hence, be overvalued during high macro disagreement months. I sort stocks based
on their past sensitivities to macro-factors and use these macro beta-sorted portfolios as test
assets.
16The correlations between the original macro-factors and the mimicking portfolios are high, ranging from
0.33 to 0.60. The weights on the base assets for each macro-factor are reasonable and are reported in the
Internet Appendix.
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For each macroeconomic factor studied in this paper, I use the past 60 months of monthly
return to estimate the macro beta for each stock in the cross-section at the beginning of
every year. This is done by regressing each stock’s excess return on the contemporaneous
corresponding factor-mimicking portfolio return.17 I require at least 24 months of stock
return data to reliably estimate a stock’s macro beta. I then sort all the stocks into ten
deciles based on these pre-ranking macro betas and hold the stocks for one year. I compute
the monthly value-weighted returns for each portfolio and then estimate the portfolio’s post-
ranking macro beta by regressing each portfolio’s monthly returns on the mimicking factors
using the whole sample data (Fama and French, 1992). If the pre-ranking macro betas truly
captures portfolios’ different exposures to macro-factors, I expect the post-ranking macro
betas to preserve the order of pre-ranking macro betas for the decile portfolio. As can be
seen from Table 3, the pre-ranking betas and post-ranking betas are aligned very well for
each macro-factor, indicating that the sorting procedure captures stocks’ true sensitivities
to macroeconomic factors instead of just sorting on measurement error in macro betas.
4 Empirical Tests
4.1 Portfolio Sorts
I first use portfolio sorts to examine the effect of macro disagreement on the cross-section
of stock returns. Table 3 reports the monthly average excess returns as well as portfolio
alphas adjusted using the Fama-French three factor model for decile portfolios sorted on
macro betas. As is evident in Table 3, sorting stocks into portfolios with large spreads in
macro betas generates little variation in average returns unconditionally. The high-minus-
low monthly portfolio excess return is close to zero for all the macroeconomic factors and
is statistically insignificant. The results are qualitatively similar for the Fama-French three
factor adjusted alphas, in which the alpha of the high-minus-low portfolio is close to zero
17In the baseline regression, I include only one macro factor at a time when calculating pre-ranking macro
betas for individual stocks. My results are robust if I also include the market return factor plus the macro
factor. Results are available in the Internet Appendix. I do not try to include all the macro factors at once
because the pre-ranking macro betas will be estimated with considerable noise this way. My results depend
crucially on using portfolios with different sensitivities to a specific macro factor, and using portfolios sorted
on poorly estimated pre-ranking macro betas reduces the power of my empirical design.
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for most of the macro-factors. The results are consistent with recent studies (Shanken and
Weinstein, 2006) showing that macroeconomic factors are only weakly priced in the cross-
section of average stock returns.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
My hypothesis predicts that during normal times (low disagreement periods), the risk-
return trade-off should work and stocks with high macro beta should earn high average
return if the macro factor is positively priced. During high disagreement periods, however,
high macro beta stocks are also subject more to the macro-level disagreement, and tend to be
overvalued by optimists due to short selling constraints. The overpricing of high macro beta
stocks decreases their subsequent returns, which partially offset the higher expected return
resulting from compensation for bearing higher macroeconomic risks. Thus, if the sample
period is divided based on the macro disagreement level, high macro beta stocks should be
seen to earn higher average returns than low macro beta stocks following low disagreement
months, while the positive relation between macro beta and average excess return should be
attenuated following high disagreement months.
The results from Table 4 confirm my hypothesis. The table reports the mean excess
portfolio returns following low and high disagreement periods. For each of the ten portfolios
in the sample, I compute the average excess portfolio return following high and low dis-
agreement months separately (defined as the top and bottom quartile of the whole sample
macro disagreement level). Consistent with my hypothesis, risky stocks earn higher average
returns than less risky stocks following low disagreement periods, and they under-perform
significantly following high disagreement periods. The differences of the high-minus-low
portfolio returns across high and low disagreement months are significant for five out of six
macro-factors and the magnitudes are large, ranging from 0.43% to 2.01%. Take industrial
production growth as an example. The high-minus-low excess portfolio return is a monthly
0.57% following low disagreement periods and becomes -1.01% following high disagreement
periods. The difference of high-minus-low excess return between the two regimes is -1.58%
(t=2.23) and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Results on other macroeconomic
factors follow a similar two-regime pattern.
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[Insert Table 4 near here]
The sign of the risk premium on the macro factors following low disagreement periods is
consistent with the prediction of asset pricing theory.18 Industrial production growth, labor
income growth, real GDP growth, investment growth and change in expected inflation are
positively priced macroeconomic risk factors. I find that, for these factors, high beta stocks
earn higher average return than low beta stocks following low disagreement states, although
the return spread is significant only for GDP growth factor.19 For Treasury bill rate, because
it is a negatively priced risk factor, I expect that the high T-bill beta stocks (less risky stocks)
earn lower return than low T-bill beta stocks (risky stocks) during normal times. This is
indeed what I find, as the high-minus-low excess portfolio return is -1.55% (t=2.39) during
low disagreement months. In high disagreement periods, however, the low T-bill beta stocks
under-perform high T-bill beta stocks by 0.46%. This is consistent with my hypothesis. The
model of Hong and Sraer (2012) predicts that it is the stocks with high absolute value of
macro beta that should be more sensitive to macro disagreement. Because most stocks are
negatively correlated with change in T-bill rate, the low T-bill beta stocks are those with
high absolute value of beta and, hence, have larger exposure to forecast dispersion on the
T-bill rate. These stocks are thus more likely to be overvalued when disagreement about
short-term interest rates is high, resulting in lower subsequent returns.
Another fact evident from Table 4 is that, the large difference in high-minus-low portfolio
excess return during the two disagreement regimes is mainly driven by the under-performance
of high macro beta stocks relatively to low macro beta stocks following high disagreement
18Asset pricing theory such as consumption-based CAPM strongly predicts that industrial production
growth, labor income growth, real GDP and investment growth are positively priced macroeconomic risk
factors as these variables are positively correlated with consumption growth. Periods of high interest rates
are usually periods of tight monetary conditions in which inflation expectations are high and liquidities are
in limited supply, so the risk price associated with the change in T-bill rate should be negative. As argued
by Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), there is no strong a priori preassumption that would sign the risk premia
for DEI. Given that positive inflation innovation tends to occur during economic booms, I conjecture that
the price of risk for inflation has a positive sign.
19Two out of six macro factors have significant high-minus-low portfolio return spread during low disagree-
ment states. However, even when disagreement is in the lowest quartile of the sample period (but not zero),
the high macro beta stocks could still be overvalued by optimists as long as the high macro beta stocks have
very large exposure to the macro factor. In the univariate predictive regression and the risk premium regres-
sion, three and four out of six macro factors, respectively, have significant constant terms, which could be
interpreted as the existence of risk premium in the zero disagreement world. For other factors, the constant
terms are positive and have similar magnitude, though they are not significant.
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months. For example, the highest macro beta portfolio sorted on industrial production
growth factor earns 1.41% lower return over the highest macro disagreement months than
over the lowest macro disagreement months. In contrast, average returns on the lowest macro
beta portfolio are similar with only 0.18% differences across two disagreement regimes. This
is consistent with my hypothesis. When macro disagreement is high, stocks that are most
sensitive to macro factors will be subject to more stock-level disagreement. Due to short-
selling constraints, arbitrage activities are not sufficient to correct the over-pricing of high
macro beta stocks, leading to lower subsequent returns. Low macro beta stocks are not
very sensitive to forecast of macroeconomic factors, so their returns should be similar across
different disagreement states.
4.2 Predictive Regression
In Subsection 4.1, I show that the return spread between risky and less risky stocks
depends on the macro-level disagreement. Another way to look for conditional effects of
macro disagreement is to use the macro disagreement measure to predict long-short portfolio
excess returns, long in stocks with the highest macro betas and short in stocks with the
lowest macro betas, similar to Baker and Wurgler (2006). A regression approach allows me to
conduct formal statistical tests, incorporate the continuous nature of the macro disagreement
measure, and control for other well-known stock return predictability effects.
Specifically, I run the following predictive regression:
Rhight−lowt = a+ bDispt−1 + t (3)
The dependent variable is the monthly return on a long-short portfolio strategy in which
I long stocks in the highest decile and short stocks in the lowest decile portfolio sorted on
pre-ranking macro betas. The independent variable Dispt−1 is the cross-sectional forecast
dispersion measure on the corresponding macroeconomic factor prevailing in the previous
quarter. Standard errors are Newey-West (1987) adjusted to account for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the results from this univariate predictive regression. The
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results are consistent with the findings regarding portfolio sorts and provide formal support to
my hypothesis. The coefficients on the lagged macro disagreement measure are statistically
significant for five out of six macro-factors. For change in expected inflation, the coefficient
on the disagreement measure is negative but not significant. The negative coefficient on
the lagged macro disagreement means that high macro beta stocks are relatively overvalued
contemporaneously. Hence, returns are lower over the coming quarter when disagreement on
this macro factor is high compared with when disagreement is low. The economic magnitude
is also large. The coefficient on the disagreement measure of industrial production growth,
for example, is -0.007 (t=-2.59). A one standard deviation increase of the disagreement
measure on industrial production growth leads to a 0.66% lower monthly return on the high-
minus-low portfolio. The effect is large relative to the unconditional monthly return spread
of 0.20% between the two extreme decile portfolios.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
The constant term from regression (3) can be interpreted as the return spread between
extreme decile portfolios when there is no disagreement on this macro factor. Unlike the
unconditional sorting results, the return spread is significantly positive for portfolios sorted
on industrial production growth and investment growth and significantly negative for Trea-
sury bill rate. For labor income growth, GDP growth and change of expected inflation, the
constant terms are still positive and have similar magnitude, though not significant. For
example, the return difference between portfolios with the highest and lowest IPG beta is a
hypothetical 1.60% (t=2.44) under zero disagreement states. In other words, the prediction
of asset pricing theory that macroeconomic factors should be systematic risk factors that get
priced in the cross-section of stock returns holds relatively well when investors agree over
these macro-factors. However, when macro disagreement is high, high macro beta stocks
become increasingly speculative and overvalued, thus offsetting the risk-return trade-off.
In the Hong and Sraer (2012) model, an individual stock’s sensitivity to macro disagree-
ment should be positively related to its absolute value of macro beta. I use the return spread
between the highest and lowest macro beta portfolio as the dependent variable mainly fol-
lowing the literature and facilitating the discussion. From a theoretical point of view, the
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return spread between the highest and lowest absolute macro beta portfolio should be used
as the dependent variable in the predictive regression.20 As can be seen in Table 3, the
absolute value of the highest macro beta portfolio is larger than the absolute value of the
lowest macro beta portfolio for four out of six macro factors. Therefore, the high-minus-low
excess portfolio return should still be negatively related to macro disagreement for these
factors. My results (untabulated) show that the coefficients on lagged macro disagreement
are still significantly negative for most of the macro factors if the dependent variable is
changed to the return spread between the highest and lowest absolute macro beta portfolios.
In a univariate (multivariate) predictive regression, five (four) out of six macro factors have
significant coefficients. Even the previous insignificant DEI now becomes significant. The
only factor that does not work is investment growth, which has a negative but insignificant
coefficient.
Previously I show that my macro disagreement measure is correlated with the investor
sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). They find that sentiment has
stronger effects on stocks that are hard-to-value and costly-to-arbitrage, such as small stocks,
young stocks, unprofitable stocks and financially distressed stocks. When sentiment is high,
the future returns on these hard-to-value and difficult-to-arbitrage stocks are relatively low.
It is thus conceivable that my high macro beta stocks may pick up these hard-to-value stocks
and my macro disagreement measure is just a proxy for investor sentiment.21 To differentiate
my disagreement story from their sentiment story, I control for the monthly sentiment index
directly in the predictive regression framework.
The effect of macro disagreement on the cross-section of stock returns that I document
here could simply reflect the time-varying nature of risk premium. It is widely known that
equity risk premium is time varying and counter-cyclical (Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; Fama
20I thank the editor for pointing this out to me.
21While the sentiment and disagreement stories are not necessarily inconsistent with each other, the
channels through which each affects the stock market is different. In Baker and Wurgler (2006), sentiment-
driven investors overvalue those stocks that are more opaque and hard to value and they classify stocks
based on observable characteristics such as firm size and age. In Hong and Sraer (2012), optimists overvalue
high beta stocks because they are overly optimistic about aggregate economy. Recently, Shen and Yu (2013)
document a two-regime pattern similar with my paper that sentiment can affect the pricing of a set of
macro-related risk factors. Antoniou et al. (2013) find the pricing of market beta varies negatively with
investor sentiment.
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and French, 1989). The predictability of the macro disagreement measure may come from
its correlation with business cycle indicators. The time-varying risk premium explanation
cannot fully account for the return predictability pattern documented in this paper for three
reasons. First, because macro disagreement is usually higher during recessions and market
downturns, the risk-based story predicts that risky (high macro beta) stocks should have
higher expected returns than less risky stocks following high disagreement months. The
empirical results are contrary to this prediction. When the proxy for macroeconomic volatil-
ity22 is added to the predictive regression that is proposed by the long-run risk literature, the
coefficient on the volatility of industrial production growth is positive, but the coefficients
on macro disagreement are still negative and significant. Second, time-varying risk premium
cannot explain why risky stocks earn lower return than less risky stocks when macro dis-
agreement is high. Time-varying risk premiums can explain the changing magnitude but not
the changing sign of the return difference between high and low macro beta stocks. Third,
I add the term spread, the default premium, the D/P ratio, and the detrended one-month
T-bill rate into the predictive regression.23 These variables are chosen as additional controls
because of their strong predictability for expected equity risk premium documented in the
literature (Fama and Schwert, 1977; Fama and French, 1988; Campbell and Shiller, 1986).
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the regression results when I control for the lagged senti-
ment index and a set of predictors. Even after controlling for all these additional macroe-
conomic state variables, the coefficients on macro disagreement barely change and remain
significant for five out of six macro factors.24 In contrast, the coefficient on sentiment index
is significantly negative only for two out of six macro factors. Among other controls, only
lagged D/P ratio has some predictive power. Thus my results do not appear to merely reflect
the effect of investor sentiment or time-varying risk premium.
22To identify the fluctuations in aggregate economic volatility, I construct a realized variance measure
based on the rolling sum of squares of monthly consumption growth and industrial production growth over
the past 12 months, following Bansal et al.(2013).
23The detrended T-bill yield is the one-month T-bill yield minus its 12-month backward moving average.
This stochastic detrending method for the short rate has been used by Campbell (1991) and Hodrick (1992),
among others.
24The reason that the coefficient on Dispt−1 changes sign for DEI is that I add D/P ratio in predictive
regression and D/P ratio has very high correlation with forecast dispersion on inflation. Moreover, the
sentiment index has very high correlation with forecast dispersion on inflation, which subsumes the predictive
ability of disagreement on this macro factor.
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I also try to distinguish this novel return predictability pattern from other well-known
effects such as size, value and momentum effects in a multivariate regression framework:
Rhight−lowt = a+ bDispt−1 + cMktrft + dSMBt + eHMLt + fUMDt + t (4)
The variable Mktrf is the excess return of the value-weighted stock market index over the
risk-free rate. SMB is the excess return on the portfolio of small stocks over big stocks.
HML is the excess return on the portfolio of stocks with high book-to-market ratio over
the portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market ratio. The variable UMD is the return on
high-momentum stocks minus the return on low-momentum stocks, where momentum is
measured over months (-12, -2).25 This regression thus investigates the ability of macro
disagreement to predict benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns.26 The results are reported
in Table 6. As we can see, the coefficients on lagged macro disagreement are unaffected or
become even stronger after I control for Fama-French (1993) three factors and the Carhart
(1997) momentum factor. This illustrates that the effect of macro disagreement is essentially
orthogonal from other well-known cross-sectional return predictability effects, thus adding a
genuine new finding to the literature.
In summary, the predictive regressions confirm the significance of the patterns suggested
in the portfolio sorts. When macro disagreement is high, future returns are relatively low
for high macro beta stocks and vice-versa. In general, the results support my hypothesis
that high macro beta stocks amplify macro-level disagreement and tend to be overvalued by
optimists in high disagreement periods.
4.3 Macro Disagreement and Macro-factor Risk Premiums
In Subsection 4.2, the predictive regression approach is used to test the hypothesis that
high macro beta stocks earn lower future returns following high macro disagreement months.
This test is performed by regressing the high-minus-low excess portfolio return on the lagged
macro disagreement measure. Only the returns of the highest and lowest decile portfolios
25These portfolios are taken from Ken French’s website and are described there.
26Baker and Wurgler (2006), Hong and Sraer (2012) and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012) all run similar
tests.
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are used in the predictive regression. In this subsection, a similar analysis is presented in
which I am interested in how macro disagreement affects the price of macroeconomic risk
factors. This method has also been used by Hong and Sraer (2012) in their study of the
relation between aggregate disagreement and the slope of the security market line.
I use a two-stage analysis procedure. I first run the monthly cross-sectional regression:
Reit = αt + βiλt + it (5)
where Reit is the monthly excess return for portfolio i during month t, and βi is the post-
ranking macro beta of portfolio i, computed as explained in Subsection 3.3.27 This gives a
time series of coefficient estimates (αˆt, λˆt). I am interested in how the estimated monthly
macro-factor risk premium λˆt correlates with the lagged macro disagreement measure. My
hypothesis predicts that the risk premiums of macro-factors should be significantly lower
following high disagreement months than following low disagreement months for positively
priced macro factors. To formally test this, I regress the monthly time-series of estimated
macro-factor risk premia on the lagged macro disagreement measure:
λˆt = a+ bDispt−1 + cXt−1 + t (6)
where Xt−1 includes all the control variables used in the predictive regression.28 This is a
more stringent test than the predictive regression test.29 In Table 7, Column (1) reports
the second-stage regression results without controls and Column (2) reports the results with
27A factor model implies that a contemporaneous relation should exist between factor loadings and average
returns. For example, in a standard CAPM, stocks that co-vary strongly with the market factor should,
on average, earn high returns over the same period. Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Fama and French
(1992, 1993), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), and Ang et.al (2006), among others, all form portfolios using
various pre-formation criteria, but examine post-ranking factor loadings that are computed over the full
sample period. That is why I use post-ranking macro betas when estimating factor risk premium.
28Controlling for Cahart (1997) four factors doesn’t affect our results.
29The high-minus-low macro beta portfolio uses the returns of only two extreme portfolios, while the
estimated factor risk premium is a linear combination of returns to all ten portfolios, with the weights being
a function of post-ranking macro beta. These two normally are not be the same. According to the Hong and
Sraer (2012) model, macro disagreement should affect not only stocks with the highest and lowest macro
betas, but also the entire slope of the curve linking macro betas with average returns. Finding a negative
relation between the high-minus-low excess portfolio return and macro disagreement does not necessarily
imply that the slope of the entire curve will also be negatively affected. In this sense, the test performed in
this subsection is more stringent.
24
all the controls. The table shows that the macro-factor risk premia are significantly lower
following high macro disagreement months. The coefficient estimates on the lagged macro
disagreement measure are all negative (except for T-bill rate) and statistically significant in
five out of six macro-factors with and without controls. The results are also in line with
the coefficient estimates from the predictive regression (3). Take again industrial production
growth as an example. The coefficient on the lagged macro disagreement measure is -0.001
(t=-2.85). A one standard deviation increase in disagreement about industrial production
growth is associated with -0.10% lower expected return per unit of macro beta. Because the
difference in post-ranking beta between the highest and lowest decile portfolio is 6.65 for
industrial production growth factor, this translates into a reduction of 0.67% excess return
for highest beta stocks relative to lowest beta stocks.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
The constant term reported in Column (1) of Table 7 can be interpreted as the price of
macroeconomic risks when there is no disagreement. Industrial production growth (IPG),
labour income growth (LaIncome) and investment growth (Investment) are significantly pos-
itively priced, and the Treasury bill rate (Tbill) is significantly negatively priced. The con-
stant term for real GDP growth (GDP) and change of expected inflation (DEI) have the
right sign, though insignificant. In other words, pervasive macroeconomic risk factors are
indeed priced when investors agree over future macroeconomic states, which tends to support
traditional asset pricing theory such as I-CAPM.
4.4 Macro Disagreement and Stock-level Disagreement
If high macro beta stocks earn lower expected return because they are more subject to
macro-level disagreement, then they should have higher stock-level disagreement, especially
during high macro disagreement months.
This hypothesis is confirmed by a panel regression, in which I estimate the following
regression equation:
yit = a+ (b+ cDispt)|βi|+ (d+ eDispt)Xit + fDispt + it (7)
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The dependent variable yit is the equal-weighted average of stock-level disagreement for
portfolio i at month t, |βi| is the absolute value of post-ranking beta for portfolio i and Xit
is the average characteristics of portfolio i at month t. I use standard deviations of analysts’
forecast of long-term EPS growth rate as a proxy for stock-level disagreement.30 X includes
the natural log of market capitalization [Ln(ME)], the natural log of book-to-market ratio
[ln(BM)] and the cumulative return from month t-12 to t-2 (Mom). Standard errors are
clustered at the portfolio and quarter dimension. I use the absolute value of macro beta
instead of macro beta itself as the explanatory variable because stocks with large negative
macro beta are also highly sensitive to macro-level disagreement. Size, book-to-market, and
past returns are included as control to account for the existing heterogeneity in the macro-
beta sorted portfolios that could correlate with stock-level disagreement.31 The coefficient
of interest is c, which is expected to be positive if my hypothesis is correct.
The results in Table 8 are consistent with my hypothesis. In Column (1), only the natural
log of market capitalization [Ln(ME)] is used as the control variable. In Column (2), X also
includes the natural log of book-to-market ratio [ln(BM)] and the cumulative return from
month t-12 to t-2 (Mom). Note that even in low macro disagreement months, high macro
beta stocks experience more stock-level disagreement than low macro beta stocks. As an
extreme case, consider a month when disagreement on the IPG factor is in the lowest value of
0.92. In such a month, analysts’ disagreement on a stock in the highest absolute beta decile is
0.22 ((-0.027+0.069*0.92)*5.67) larger relative to the disagreement experienced by a stock in
the lowest absolute beta decile in the same month. Moreover, the relation between stock-level
disagreement and macro beta becomes significantly steeper as macro disagreement increases.
The coefficients on the interaction between macro disagreement and absolute macro beta are
positive for five out of six macro-factors and four are significant. A one standard deviation
increase in macro disagreement on the IPG factor increases the stock-level disagreement on
a stock of highest IPG beta by 0.37 relative to the stock-level disagreement on a stock of
30Using the standard deviation of analysts’ annual EPS forecast as a proxy for stock-level disagreement
as in Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) yields similar results.
31For example, small stocks tend to have high macro betas as well as more stock-level disagreement
(Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002). The relation between stock-level disagreement and macro beta in
the time-series thus could be driven by size. This is why I control for both firm characteristics and their
interaction with macro disagreement.
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lowest IPG beta, which represents 7% of the in-sample standard deviation of the stock-level
disagreement. The results thus support the basic premise of my analysis that high macro
beta stocks are overvalued by optimists during high macro disagreement months precisely
because they have more exposure to macro-level disagreement.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
While the results in Table 8 are consistent with the underlying channel that drives the
overvaluation of high macro beta stocks in the first place, the relation between macro-level
and stock-level disagreement could be more complex. Disagreement on macro factors could
relate to disagreement about cash flow or the discount rate for individual stocks. While
disagreement on an individual stock’s cash flow could be directly measured by its EPS
forecast dispersion, a plausible disagreement measure on a stock’s discount rate is difficult
to come up with. That is why regression (7) is able to capture only the relation between
macro disagreement and stock-level disagreement on cash flows. Finally, while regression
(7) is run at the portfolio level, the results also hold if the panel regression is run at the
individual stock level. This result is not reported for brevity.
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Controlling for Market Beta
Hong and Sraer (2012) show that high market beta stocks earn lower future return when
aggregate disagreement is high. One concern is that the evidence documented in this paper
may be just a refinement of their findings, especially if macro beta is also highly correlated
with market beta. In this subsection, I conduct tests that can isolate the effect of macro
beta from market beta.
I use two methods to control for the effect of market beta. The first is to conduct condi-
tional double sorts based on both market beta and macro beta. Specifically, when forming
testing portfolios at the beginning of every year, I sort all the stocks into ten deciles based
on the pre-ranking market beta. The pre-ranking market beta is estimated by regressing
the past 60 months of excess stock return on the contemporaneous excess market return.
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Within each market beta-sorted portfolio, I further sort stocks into ten portfolios based on
the pre-ranking macro beta, resulting in one hundred market beta-macro beta double-sorted
portfolios. To form ten macro beta-sorted portfolios, the stocks with the same macro beta
rank across all the 10 market beta sorted portfolios are aggregated. This approach effectively
forms portfolios that have similar market beta while preserving the large spread of macro
beta. Using this new set of ten macro beta-sorted portfolios (after controlling for market
beta), I rerun the predictive regression as in Subsection 4.2. If my results are entirely driven
by the disagreement-amplifying effect of market beta, the coefficients on the lagged macro
disagreement should not be significantly negative. Table 9 reports the predictive regression
results when the high-minus-low macro beta portfolio excess return is regressed on the lagged
macro disagreement measure, with and without controls. The coefficients are still signifi-
cant for five out of six macro factors in the univariate regression and four are significant in
the multivariate regression. Thus my results provide independent evidence relative to the
market beta of Hong and Sraer (2012), showing that high macro beta stocks could amplify
macro-level disagreement.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
The second approach I use to control for the effect of market beta is that, when estimating
pre-ranking macro beta for each stock, I also include the excess return on the market factor.
I then form ten portfolios based on these pre-ranking macro betas and redo the tests. The
results are qualitatively similar. For brevity, I do not report them here.
5.2 Alternative Explanations
Several competing explanations are proposed to explain the empirical failure of the
CAPM. Apart from the disagreement story of Hong and Sraer (2012), the money illusion
effect documented by Cohen et al. (2005), the benchmarked institutional investors story of
Baker, Bradley, and Wurgler (2011), and the leverage constraints explanation of Frazzini
and Pedersen (2014) all could account for the high beta-lower risk-adjusted returns puzzle.
Although my results are most consistent with the disagreement-based explanation for the
macro factors, other mechanisms proposed by these prior studies could drive my results.
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To investigate the alternative explanations, I add additional controls in the predictive
regression, including an inflation rate, an aggregate disagreement measure, the VIX index,
the consumption-to-wealth ratio CAY (capturing time-varying risk premium), and the TED
spread (proxy for funding constraints as in Frazzni and Petersen (2014)). The consumption-
to-wealth ratio, CAY, is taken from Martin Lettau’s website. The results are reported in
Table 10. The coefficients on the lagged macro disagreement measure are still significant for
four out of six macro factors, although the effect becomes weaker after controlling for all
these variables. Among all the control variables, TED spread has the strongest predictive
power. The coefficients on TED have the correct sign for all six macro factors, but only two
are significant.32
[Insert Table 10 near here]
In addition, risk-based explanations could still work, despite my best effort in controlling
for it. For example, high macro beta stocks may have large exposures to innovations in
market volatility. The high correlation between macro disagreement measures and market
volatility means that when macro disagreement is high, the stock market likely is volatile. If
high macro beta stocks pay off at uncertain economic environments, they demand lower risk
premiums in equilibrium. Bali, Brown and Tang (2014) find that economic uncertainty betas
can generate cross-sectional return spread consistent with the hedging argument. They use
the same SPF database to construct their economic uncertainty measure.33 To differentiate
this risk-based argument with the overpricing effect documented in this paper, I regress
macro beta-sorted decile portfolio returns on innovation in the monthly VIX index. The
risk-based story predicts that high macro beta stocks should have more positive exposure
to innovation in volatility than low macro beta stocks. However, high macro beta stocks
actually have more negative exposures to change in the VIX than low macro beta stocks
(the result is not reported here but available in the Internet Appendix), so accounting for
portfolios’ differential exposure to market volatility only exaggerates the puzzle documented
32The Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) model predicts that when funding constraints tighten, expected return
for high (low) beta assets should decrease (increase). Therefore, TED spread should predict the high-minus-
low portfolio return spread negatively.
33The hedging argument, however, can explain only the unconditional return spread of different macro




The systematic risk explanation comes in two basic flavors. One is that the risk premium
could vary with macro disagreement, which I have already examined by including variables
such as the D/P ratio, the term spread, the default premium, the detrended one-month
T-bill rate, and CAY in both predictive regressions and two-stage regression analyses. The
other is that systematic risks (beta loadings) of stocks vary over the business cycle and may
be correlated with the macro disagreement measures. I investigate this possibility directly in
Table 11, examing whether the macro disagreement measure coincides with time-variation
in market betas in a way that could at least qualitatively reconcile the earlier results with a
conditional CAPM. Specifically, I predict returns on the high-minus-low portfolio with the
following specification:
Rhight−lowt = a+ bDispt−1 +(c+dDispt−1 +fCAYt−1 +gTbill dt−1 +hD/Pt−1)∗Mktrft + t
(8)
The linear model for the market beta follows Shanken (1990). The results indicate that
the conditional beta model cannot explain my finding that high-minus-low portfolio excess
return is negatively related to macro disagreement, as the coefficients b are still significant
for five out of six macro factors.
[Insert Table 11 near here]
6 Conclusion
Macroeconomic risk factors should play an important role in explaining the cross-section
of stock returns as predicted by traditional asset pricing paradigms. However, empirical
evidence (as confirmed in this paper) shows that the stocks with greater risk exposure to
macro-factors do not earn higher expected returns than stocks with lower exposure to macro-
factors. In this paper, I argue that disagreement on macroeconomic variables, when combined
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with short-sales constraints, could potentially explain this puzzle. In particular, I document a
striking two-regime pattern, whereas high macro beta (risky) stocks earn lower future returns
relative to low macro beta (less risky) stocks following high macro disagreement periods and
vice versa. I hypothesize that this is because high macro beta stocks are more sensitive
to forecasts on macro-factors and are more likely to be overpriced when disagreement on
the macro-factor is high. This implies that high macro beta stocks should have a larger
component of stock-level disagreement coming from its exposure to macro-level disagreement,
which is also confirmed in the paper.
My study shows that the underlying source of disagreement on individual stocks is partly
from investors’ disagreement on economic-wide macro-factors. The same macroeconomic
forces should also affect other asset classes, such as Treasury bonds and commodities, the
price of which are highly sensitive to forecasts about the future macroeconomic environ-
ment.34 In future work, I hope to offer a better understanding of various sources of disagree-
ment as well as the impact of macro disagreement on other assets.
34Using the same framework, Hong, Sraer and Yu (2014) find that when disagreement about future inflation
rate is high, long-maturity bonds become more overvalued than short-maturity bonds and the yield curve
flattens. This is consistent with the notion that high inflation beta assets (such as long-maturity bonds)
have larger exposure to disagreement on future inflation rate than low inflation beta assets.
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(a) Industrial Production Growth (b) Unemployment rate
(c) 3-month T-bill rate (d) Real GDP growth
(e) Inflation rate (f) Real nonresidential investment
Figure 1: Macro Disagreement, 1981Q3-2011Q4
The figure plots the time series of cross-sectional forecast dispersion on six macroeconomic variables,
including industrial production growth, the unemployment rate, the 3-month Treasury bill rate, the real
GDP growth, the inflation rate and the real nonresidential fixed investment growth. The sample period
runs from the third quarter of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 2011. Shaded areas are NBER dated recession
periods. The data on macro disagreement is from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) database
currently maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of six macro disagreement measures for: industrial production
growth (IPG), the unemployment rate (Unemploy), the consumer price index (Inflation), a three-month
Treasury-bill rate (Tbill), the real GDP growth (GDP) and real nonresidential private investment growth
(Investment). Panel A reports various summary statistics of these six macro disagreement measures.
Also reported are summary statistics of seasonally adjusted monthly consumption growth (Con g), an
expected market volatility (Mkt vol.), the dividend/price ratio (D/P), an aggregate disagreement measure
(Agg Disp.), the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index (Sentiment), the term spread, the default premium,
the detrended one-month T-bill rate (Tbill d), the monthly inflation rate, the consumption-to-wealth
ratio (CAY), the TED spread and the VIX. Panel B reports the pairwise correlations among the macro
disagreement measures and other macroeconomic variables. Panel C reports the regression results of macro
disagreement measure on its lags. The lag ranges from one quarter to twelve quarters. The t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for auto-correlations of 12 quarter lags using Newey and West (1987). The sample
period runs from 1981Q3 to 2011Q4.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable # of obs. Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Macro Disagreement Measures
IPG 122 2.37 0.94 0.92 5.52
Unemploy 122 0.30 0.10 0.15 0.66
Inflation 122 0.86 0.32 0.38 2.02
Tbill 122 0.53 0.37 0.11 2.96
GDP 122 1.10 0.38 0.56 2.35
Investment 122 3.93 1.08 2.06 8.63
Other Variables
Con g 366 0.14% 0.34% -1.41% 1.22%
Mkt vol. 366 0.24% 0.16% 0.07% 1.09%
D/P 366 2.64% 1.15% 1.08% 6.37%
Agg Disp. 361 3.46 0.59 2.67 5.21
Sentiment 354 0.26 0.66 -0.90 2.50
Term Spread 366 1.40% 1.07% -1.78% 3.40%
Default Premium 366 1.09% 0.48% 0.55% 3.38%
Tbill d 366 -0.25% 0.97% -4.22% 1.93%
Inflation rate 366 0.25% 0.27% -1.79% 1.37%
CAY 122 0.64% 2.42% -5.74% 4.48%
TED 312 0.65% 0.44% 0.12% 3.39%









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lag in quarters 1 2 4 8 12
IPG 0.46 0.31 0.32 0.16 0.19
t-stat (6.42) (2.80) (2.54) (1.59) (2.49)
Unemploy 0.38 0.27 0.19 -0.03 -0.07
t-stat (3.40) (2.71) (2.39) (-0.38) (-1.03)
Tbill 0.54 0.57 0.41 0.26 0.24
t-stat (6.85) (10.71) (6.31) (2.44) (2.72)
GDP 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.28 0.21
t-stat (4.19) (5.39) (6.29) (2.19) (1.93)
Investment 0.41 0.28 0.14 0.02 -0.10
t-stat (3.73) (1.79) (1.22) (0.16) (-1.01)
Inflation 0.52 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.21
t-stat (7.29) (4.45) (3.61) (3.54) (2.56)
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Table 2: Correlations among Macroeconomic Factors and Factor Mimicking Port-
folios
This table reports the correlations among macroeconomic factors (Panel A) and among factor mimicking
portfolio returns (Panel B). GDP growth and investment growth are sampled at quarterly frequency and all
other macro-factors are sampled at monthly frequency. Monthly variables are time aggregated to quarterly
frequency to calculate the correlations among factors. The sample period runs from January 1976 to
December 2011.
Panel A: Correlations among Macro-factors
Macro Factors IPG LaIncome Tbill GDP Investment DEI
IPG 1.00 0.28 -0.06 0.58 0.49 0.39
LaIncome 1.00 0.56 0.40 0.50 0.20
Tbill 1.00 0.05 0.13 -0.03
GDP 1.00 0.64 0.27
Investment 1.00 0.16
DEI 1.00
Panel B: Correlations among Factor Mimicking Portfolios
Mimicking Factors IPG LaIncome Tbill GDP Investment DEI
IPG 1.00 0.21 -0.19 0.77 0.61 0.68
LaIncome 1.00 0.82 0.25 0.51 0.27
Tbill 1.00 -0.04 0.16 -0.12































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: Time Series Regression of Portfolio Returns, controlling for Aggregate
Disagreement, VIX, CAY and TED
IPG LaIncome Tbill GDP Investment DEI
Disp(t-1) -0.006* -0.132*** 0.029* -0.008 -0.007** 0.012
(-1.78) (-2.79) (1.82) (-0.69) (-2.02) (0.61)
Sentiment (t-1) 0.014 -0.017 -0.006 0.018 0.033*** -0.015
(1.31) (-1.53) (-0.48) (1.63) (2.80) (-1.57)
D/P ratio (t-1) 0.990 0.565 -0.322 2.525** 1.596 -0.387
(1.16) (0.48) (-0.26) (2.08) (1.07) (-0.37)
Term Spread (t-1) -0.266 -0.496 0.133 -0.299 0.494 -0.264
(-0.56) (-0.99) (0.27) (-0.63) (1.08) (-0.63)
Default Premium (t-1) 0.852 0.904 -2.708* 0.711 1.031 0.301
(0.54) (0.47) (-1.75) (0.45) (0.59) (0.16)
Tbill detrend (t-1) -0.109 -0.583 0.406 -0.625 -0.079 -0.158
(-0.21) (-0.97) (0.72) (-1.17) (-0.15) (-0.30)
Inflation (t-1) -0.440 -2.352 0.784 0.068 0.933 -2.118
(-0.35) (-1.61) (0.52) (0.07) (0.64) (-1.38)
Aggregate Disagreement (t-1) 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.014 -0.013 -0.002
(0.14) (0.10) (-0.24) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-0.16)
VIX (t-1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* -0.000 0.000
(0.84) (0.69) (0.75) (1.78) (-0.09) (0.58)
CAY (t-1) -0.197 -0.242 -0.001 -0.445 -0.458 -0.265
(-0.83) (-0.70) (-0.00) (-1.30) (-1.15) (-0.92)
TED (t-1) -2.833** -2.478 0.740 -5.103*** -2.425 -0.327
(-2.25) (-1.62) (0.41) (-3.03) (-1.35) (-0.22)
Constant -0.006 0.035 0.002 0.008 0.037 0.009
(-0.18) (0.88) (0.06) (0.22) (0.99) (0.21)
N.of obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299
This table reports the regression result of long-short portfolio excess returns on the lagged macro disagree-
ment measure (Disp), controlling for a set of lagged predictors, including the Baker-Wurgler sentiment
index (Sentiment), the dividend/price ratio (D/P), the term spread, the default premium, a detrended
one-month T-bill rate (Tbill detrend), the inflation rate, an aggregate disagreement measure, the VIX, the
consumption-to-wealth ratio (CAY), and the TED spread. The long-short portfolios are formed by long the
portfolio with highest macro beta and short the portfolio with the lowest macro beta. All the t-statistics
are based on Newey and West (1987) to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and *
stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 11: Time Series Regression of Portfolio Returns, controlling for Conditional
Market Beta
IPG LaIncome Tbill GDP Investment DEI
Disp (t-1) -0.007** -0.060** 0.017** -0.016*** -0.004** -0.016
(-2.51) (-2.14) (2.43) (-2.60) (-1.97) (-1.20)
Mktrf (t) -0.212 0.389 -0.024 -0.855*** -0.453 0.602***
(-0.91) (0.95) (-0.09) (-3.16) (-1.62) (2.81)
Disp (t-1) * Mktrf (t) -0.046 -0.123 0.010 0.391* -0.105 -0.090
(-0.66) (-0.16) (0.03) (1.93) (-1.58) (-0.30)
CAY (t-1) * Mktrf (t) -14.220*** -14.363*** 17.900*** -9.635** -13.585*** -16.315***
(-3.86) (-3.33) (4.74) (-2.50) (-4.26) (-4.35)
Tbill d (t-1) * Mktrf (t) 14.097 -2.688 -38.074*** 24.820*** 5.492 9.204
(1.62) (-0.23) (-3.80) (3.07) (0.54) (0.88)
D/P (t-1) * Mktrf (t) 24.227*** -6.434 -29.178** 31.338*** 22.638*** -2.006
(2.89) (-0.66) (-2.18) (3.31) (2.84) (-0.20)
Constant 0.015** 0.017 -0.010 0.013* 0.022*** 0.008
(2.36) (1.49) (-1.57) (1.75) (2.60) (0.83)
N.of Obs. 366 366 366 366 366 366
This table reports the regression results of long-short portfolio excess returns on the lagged macro
disagreement measure (Disp) and the excess market return, in which the conditional beta is a function of
lagged macro disagreement, the consumption-to-wealth ratio (CAY), a detrended one-month T-bill rate
(Tbill detrend), and the dividend/price ratio (D/P). The long-short portfolios are formed by long the
portfolio with highest macro beta and short the portfolio with the lowest macro beta. All the t-statistics
are based on Newey and West (1987) to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and *
stands for significance level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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